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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This case was transferred to this Court by the Utah Supreme Court pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2 (4), and this Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2a-3 (2XJ). 
STATEMENT OF ADDITIONAL ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
In addition to those issues stated in Thomas' Statement of Issues Presented for 
Review, Thomas' appeal presents the following issue for this Court's review: Did the trial 
court properly dismiss Thomas' case for failure to prosecute? 
The trial court's dismissal for failure to prosecute a claim with reasonable 
diligence "will not be disturbed on appeal unless it is manifest from the record that the 
court's discretion has been abused." Brasher Motor and Finance Company v. Brown, 461 
P.2d 464 (Utah 1969). 
This issue is preserved for appeal in that the issue was cited by the trial court as a 
basis for its Order Granting Defendants9 Motion for Summary Judgment, entered 
November 24, 1997. (R. 337-338) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Underlying Claim 
Although this case has traveled a somewhat tangled procedural path, when all of 
the superfluous matters are distilled from this case, this case is at its heart a simple action 
for collection on an alleged contract pertaining to the sale of a PBX telephone switch (the 
"Switch"). Thomas' original Complaint in this matter was 17 pages in length, and 
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alleged causes of action not only against 3D Communications, Inc. ("3D"), the 
corporation which sold the Switch, but also against its employees Von Gordon, Ron 
Davies and Phil Davies, conclusorily asserting that 3D is a "sham corporation" which is 
the alter ego of the individual defendants, without any specific allegation or support for 
how this is so. (R. 1-17) Thomas alleges that he purchased the switch from 3D as a 
leasing agent, and then leased the Switch to the business JD West Associates ("JD 
West"). Id 
Thomas alleges in substance that in the purchase of the Switch, Thomas was 
misled as to issues pertaining to Thomas' security in the Switch, such as the resale value, 
in the event that JD West defaulted in its lease. (R. 3-5) Defendants assert that 
Defendants sold the Switch to JD West, that all dealings were by and between 3D and JD 
West, and that 3D never had any agreement nor direct transaction with Thomas, and 
Thomas was in fact a financing agent for JD West. (R. 26-33) As such, any recourse 
Thomas had was against JD West. Id. 
Conflict of Interest of Brian W. Steffensen 
At the time the Switch was purchased, Brian W. Steffensen was a principle in JD 
West, and handled most of the negotiations for the purchase of the Switch, and personally 
signed the Work Orders and Sales Agreements for that Switch. (E.g., R. 37-38, 42-48) 
On June 30, 1989, Brian Steffensen sent a letter to Ron Davies acknowledging that Brian 
Steffensen owed an obligation to Thomas on the switch, and predicting that he would be 
sued in this matter. (R. 119) 
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Subsequent "Contract" with Von Gordon 
Upon JD West's default, Thomas repossessed the Switch from JD West. (R. 4-5) 
Thomas' son, a JD West employee, then contacted 3D and asserted various claims against 
3D pertaining to the sale of the Switch. Id 3D ultimately found a buyer and resold the 
Switch for Thomas. (R. 7-8) In October, 1989, during the course of negotiations over the 
repurchase of the Switch, Von Gordon signed a hand-written document to the effect that 
3D would pay Thomas $22,000 for the Switch. (R. 18) The document provided Thomas 
would be entitled to interest and attorneys' fees necessarily incurred to collect the 
$22,000. Id 
Von Gordon was never an officer or director of 3D, and never had any authority to 
sign contracts or agreements on 3D's behalf, except for preprinted documents which had 
been pre-approved by 3D. (R. 39-40) That document was not brought to 3D's attention 
until November 16, 1989, at which time 3D tendered a check to Thomas in the amount of 
$22,000 for the repurchase of the Switch. IdL Due to the tenor of the negotiations with 
Thomas over the repurchase of the Switch, the check contained a restrictive endorsement 
to the effect that by endorsing the check Thomas would release 3D from all claims arising 
prior to November 16, 1989. (R. 9) Thomas objected to the restrictive endorsement and 
did not cash the check. (R. 9-10) 
Relevant Procedural History 
Thomas filed this action February 9, 1989. (R. 1-17) On March 7, 1990, 
Defendants filed a Defendant's Motions to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim (the 
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"Motion to Dismiss").1 (R. 22-25) At approximately that time, Defendants also moved 
to disqualify Brian W. Steffensen from acting as counsel for Thomas, among other 
reasons, because Mr. Steffensen is a material witness in this case. (R. 48-49) 
In response, Thomas filed lengthy memoranda, numerous lengthy affidavits, and a 
Motion for Leave to file First Amended Complaint, with a proposed amended complaint 
of 21 pages, all of which totaled approximately 85 pages. (R. 56-139) 
Defendants moved to strike the affidavits which Thomas had filed in opposition to 
the First Motion for Summary Judgment, on the bases that the affidavits (1) lacked 
foimdation, (2) include inadmissible hearsay, inappropriate opinion testimony, irrelevant 
material, and speculation, (3) violate the parol evidence rule, (4) with respect to the 
Affidavit of Richard Roth, the affidavit was unsigned, and (5) with respect to the Affidavit 
of Ranee Larsen, the signature and notarization on the affidavit were not original. 
(R. 146-150, at 147) Thomas made no effort to correct the deficiencies in the affidavits, 
but rather argued that it was incumbent upon Defendants to comb through Thomas' 
lengthy affidavits to specifically identify each deficiency for Thomas so that Thomas 
could correct them. (R. 350, 21:23-22:13) 
At the May 21, 1990 hearing, the trial court chastised Thomas counsel for the 
burdensome and voluminous pleadings filed with respect to what is really a simple 
matter. (R. 350, 6:17-21, 13:12-24) On June 4, 1990, the trial court entered the Order 
^though styled as a motion to dismiss, Defendants' motion was treated as a 
Motion for Summary Judgment pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
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Granting Defendants 'Motions to Dismiss, Motion to Disqualify Brian W. Steffensen, 
Motion to Strike Affidavits, and Plaintiff's Motion to Amend Complaint (the "1990 
Order"). (R. 155-158) In the 1990 Order, the trial court struck the affidavits submitted 
by Thomas, dismissed Thomas' causes of action against the individual defendants on the 
basis that Thomas had failed to plead sufficient facts to pierce the corporate veil of 3D, 
and dismissed the First, Second, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Causes of Action 
against 3D. Id In addition, the trial court disqualified Brian Steffensen from acting as 
counsel for Thomas, and granted Thomas leave to file a pared down amended complaint. 
Id. In that order, the Court further noted a stipulation of counsel for the parties that 3D 
would tender a new check to Thomas without a restrictive endorsement in the amount of 
$22,000 plus interest at the market rate for interest-bearing checking accounts. Lcl 
On November 28, 1990, Thomas filed the Second Amended Complaint, which was 
14 pages in length. (R. 172-185) The Second Amended Complaint alleged that the 
amount sought was less than $10,000. Id. 
Pursuant to Thomas' motion, the case was transferred to Circuit Court. (R. 186-
187) On July 31, 1991, Defendants moved for summary judgment on the claims asserted 
in the Second Amended Complaint based in part on the District Court's prior ruling. 
(R. 271-272) On September 27, 1991, in response to Defendants' motion for summary 
judgment, Circuit Court Judge Dennis Fuchs remanded the case back to the District Court 
to interpret the District Court's 1990 Order with respect to the pending motion for 
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summary judgment, with the recommendation that the matter be set for trial or the 
pending motion for summary judgment should be heard by Judge Young. (R. 308) 
After September, 1991, nothing happened on this case for approximately 5Vi years, 
until March 26, 1997, at which time Thomas filed a Request for Ruling on Plaintiffs 
Motion and Request for Oral Argument. (R. 313-315) In that Request, Thomas did not 
offer any excuse nor explanation for why Thomas had failed to pursue this matter for 
approximately 5lA years. IdL 
Pursuant to Thomas' request, a hearing was held in this matter before Judge Young 
on May 16, 1997. (R. 351) At that hearing Judge Young stated the following: 
How can anybody think that this case was not over, 
when there's been no action in this case since 1991? 
I certainly thought the case was over. I thought it was 
resolved, and that the interest was paid.... 
And so that was in the Circuit Court at the time, which 
is now Division Two. But has there been any activity on this 
case recently, since 1991? 
(Id. at 7:2-12) Thomas offered no explanation for the 5% year dormancy of this case 
except that "the case basically got lost in limbo somewhere between the Circuit Court and 
this Court." (M, at 7:15-17) On November 24, 1997, the trial court entered the Order 
Granting Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (the "1997 Order") in which the 
trial court dismissed Thomas' claims on the bases that (1) the issues raised in Thomas' 
Second Amended Complaint were addressed in the 1990 Order, and (2) Thomas had failed 
to pursue the action in a timely manner "suggesting that the parties consider the matter to 
be complete or not to warrant further action." Id 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
It is well settled that the trial court has discretion to dismiss a claim for failure to 
prosecute the claim with reasonable diligence. The court's dismissal will not be disturbed 
on appeal unless it is manifest from the record that the court's discretion has been abused. 
There was no action taken in the present case for over 5^ 2 years. Thomas failed to 
provide any explanation or excuse for the inactivity in this case. Under those 
circumstances, it cannot be said that the trial court abused its discretion by dismissing this 
case. 
The trial court properly struck the affidavits submitted by Thomas. Thomas 
explicitly and tacitly acknowledges that the affidavits were deficient. Those affidavits 
were part of the papers filed by Thomas which the Court deemed to be disproportionately 
voluminous and burdensome with respect to the nature of this case. Under those 
circumstances, Thomas' attempt to shift the burden to Defendants or the trial court to 
identify the admissible portions of the admittedly deficient affidavits was improper, and 
the trial court properly struck those affidavits. 
In the absence of any admissible evidence to the contrary, the trial court properly 
granted defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, thereby dismissing Thomas' claims. 
Thomas' attempts to incorporate argument from prior filings is improper. 
Moreover, Thomas' objection to entry of the 1990 Order is without any basis or 
foundation. 
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The trial court properly dismissed Thomas' alter ego claims against the individual 
defendants. Thomas' reliance upon conclusory and unsubstantiated assertions without 
any factual specificity is improper, and will not survive summary judgment in the face of 
the assertions in the Affidavit of Ronald G. Davies. 
Having acknowledged that Thomas' Complaint did not properly plead a cause of 
action for equitable estoppel, Thomas is in no position to object to the trial court's 
dismissal of that cause of action. Thomas' reliance upon the First Amended Complaint to 
support Thomas' alter ego theory is misplaced where Thomas was never granted leave to 
file the First Amended Complaint. 
Thomas and Brian Steffensen each acknowledge that Mr. Steffensen is a material 
witness in this case. It is well settled under Utah law and Rules of Professional Conduct 
that an attorney may not act as an advocate and witness in the same manner. As such, the 
trial court properly disqualified Mr. Steffensen from further representing Mr. Thomas in 
this case. 
ARGUMENT 
I. The trial court was within its discretion to dismiss Thomas5 claims for failure 
to prosecute with reasonable diligence. 
It is well-settled that the trial court has discretion to dismiss a claim for failure to 
prosecute the claim with reasonable diligence. The case of Brasher Motor and Finance 
Company v. BrowiL 461 P.2d 464 (Utah 1969) is particularly instructive to, and 
dispositive of, the present case, in that its facts closely parallel the material facts in this 
case. In that case, after allowing a matter to lie dormant for 5Vi years, "with a silent 
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reverence accorded that which is interred," the court stated that one of the parties, "like 
Abou Ben Adhem, awoke from a dream of peace and attempted to exhume and reactivate 
what for all intents and purposes appeared to have been a litigious corpse." Id 
On his own motion, the trial judge dismissed the parties' claims. Id On appeal, 
the counterclaimant argued that the court had no authority to dismiss the counterclaim 
under Rule 41, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, since no party had moved for dismissal. 
Id. The Utah Supreme Court not only upheld the trial court's action, but applauded it. 
The following quotation from the court's opinion in that case bears repeating, both 
for the close parallels between that and the present cases, as well as the sagacity of the 
court's opinion: 
The plaintiff did not move to dismiss the complaint, but the trial 
court, in its discretion, did dismiss it sua sponte, as it did the 
counterclaim.... 
In our opinion, the trial court in urging a plague on both of the 
litigants' houses by its sua sponte action, made a gesture that, if employed 
by more judges, could aid in the elimination of backlogs, and help to restore 
that loss of public confidence in the judiciary engendered thereby. 
We espouse the statement made in Reed v. First Nat. Bk.. where it 
said: 
In dismissing an action for want of prosecution, the 
court may proceed under the statute, or it may, of its own 
motion, take action to that end. In acting on its own motion, 
the court must proceed with judicial discretion. Its ruling will 
not be disturbed on appeal unless it is manifest from the 
record that the court's discretion has been abused. 
We believe and hold that in the instant case the trial court did not 
abuse its discretion, but on the contrary acted with judicial propriety 
looking to the interests of all litigants and in promoting their causes with 
reasonable dispatch, — certainly in preventing indiscriminate jostling and 
clogging of court calenders. 
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461 P.2d at 464-465 (citation omitted, emphasis original). Cf, Reliance v. Caine, 555 
P.2d 276 (Utah 1976); Thompson Ditch Company v. Jackson. 508 P.2d 528 (Utah 1973) 
(The same standard is applied with regard to dismissals under Rule 41, Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, where an opposing party has first formally moved for dismissal). 
In the present case, when Thomas attempted to resurrect the "litigious corpse" that 
this case had become, the trial court granted a hearing, at which Thomas was given fall 
opportunity to explain "silent reverence" that, like in Brasher, had been accorded this case 
for the past 5*/2 years. The record from that May 16, 1997 hearing, reflects the following 
exchange: 
THE COURT: How can anybody think that this case 
was not over, when there's been no action in this case since 
1991? 
I certainly thought the case was over. I thought it was 
resolved, and that the interest was paid. And my docket, 
unless I'm looking at the wrong docket, there were activities 
on this case before Judge Fuchs, and then activities before me. 
And so that was in the circuit court at the time, which 
is now Division Two. But has there been any activity on this 
case recently, since 1991? 
MR. STEFFENSEN: To answer your question, Your 
Honor, I'm not aware of any recently brought in the case. I 
think that the case basically got lost in limbo somewhere 
between the circuit court and this court. I think that we had a 
pending resolution of the Motion for Summary Judgment. 
(R. 351, 7:2-7:18) In the 1997 Order, the court expressly found and ordered that: 
2. No activity has occurred in this matter since 
September 27, 1991, suggesting that the parties consider this 
matter either to be resolved, or not to warrant further action. 
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3. Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint and all 
remaining claims in this matter are hereby dismissed with 
prejudice. 
(R. 338) 
Thomas has not provided any explanation or excuse for Thomas5 failure to pursue 
this matter in a timely fashion. The period dormancy of this case is precisely the same as 
that in Brasher, for which the Utah Supreme Court applauded the trial court's dismissal. 
Under these facts, it cannot be seriously argued that it is "manifest from the record that 
the court's discretion has been abused." Brasher. 461 P.2d at 465. As such, the trial 
court's dismissal must be upheld. 
n. The trial court properly struck the affidavits of Joe L. Thomas. Allan 
Thomas. Brian W. Steffensen. Ranee Larsen and Richard Roth, 
It is well-settled that an affidavit filed with respect to a motion for summary 
judgment which fails to meet requirements of Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, is 
subject to a motion to strike. E.g., Howick v. Bank of Salt Lake, 498 P.2d 352, 353-54 
(Utah 1972); GNS Partnership v. Fullmer. 873 P.2d 1157, 1164 (Utah App. 1994). 
Affidavits which merely recite conclusions, contentions and bear allegations are 
insufficient even at the summary judgment level. See, e.g.. Frisbee v. K & K Constr. Co.. 
676 P.2d 387, 390 (Utah 1984). Thomas acknowledges that the affidavits filed by 
Thomas in opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment were deficient,2 but 
2Thomas states "it is clear that most of the statements [in Thomas' affidavits] are 
admissible... even if some portions of Thomas' affidavits contained argument, the vast 
majority of the statements contained therein consisted of proper and admissible averments 
of facts . . . " "Thomas admits that some statements in his own affidavit constituted 
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then argues that it was improper for the court to strike those affidavits because 
Defendants' Motion to Strike was not specific enough with respect to the deficiencies, and 
the Affidavits did contain some admissible evidence. Notably, Thomas did not file any 
opposition to Defendants' Motion to Strike. Rather, Thomas now argues that it was 
incumbent upon Defendants and/or the court to comb through Thomas' affidavits in order 
to ferret out those statements which were admissible. Having failed to file any opposition 
to the Motion to Strike or make any attempt to correct the deficiencies in Thomas' 
affidavits, Thomas has failed to preserve any objection to the striking of those affidavits. 
In Brief of Appellant, Thomas cites one example of one paragraph of one affidavit 
which Thomas considers to be admissible and then argues that all of the stricken 
affidavits were admissible. The Affidavit of Richard Roth which was submitted to 
Defendants' counsel was unsigned. Although Thomas refers to Mr. Roth's affidavit in 
Plaintiff Allan Thomas9 Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motions to Dismiss 
(p. 9, If 24), the record does not reflect that the Roth affidavit was ever filed with the 
court. 
Similarly, with respect specifically to the Affidavit of Ranee Larsen, upon which 
Thomas relies extensively in Plaintiff Allan Thomas' Memorandum in Opposition to 
hearsay coming from him. However, the Affidavits of Larsen, Steffensen and Joe 
Thomas are almost entirely admissible...." and "[t]his, and almost every other paragraph 
in Thomas' Affidavits, was and is fully admissible and should not have been stricken." 
Brief of Appellant, pp. 7, 22-23 (emphasis added). Although explicitly and tacitly 
acknowledging that portions of the Affidavits of Thomas, Larsen, Steffensen and Joe 
Thomas affidavits are inadmissible, Thomas again fails to specify which portions Thomas 
believes are admissible. 
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Defendants1 Motions to Dismiss, Defendants specifically noted that the affidavit was 
deficient in that the signatures of Mr. Larsen and the notarization were not original 
signatures. Thomas made no attempt to correct this or the other deficiencies, but rather 
argues that it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to strike the admittedly 
defective affidavits, without the trial court taking it upon itself or requiring Defendants to 
identify the admissible portions. Had Thomas wished to correct the deficiencies or 
oppose Defendants' Motion to Strike, Thomas had every opportunity to do so but elected 
not to. Accordingly, the trial court properly struck the affidavits in question. 
III. In the absence of any admissible evidence to the contrary* the trial court 
properly granted Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment 
Thomas argues that there were disputed facts which precluded summary judgment. 
However, the mere assertion of a dispute does not preclude the entry of summary 
judgment. D & L Supply v. Saurini. 775 P.2d 420 (Utah 1989). Rather, a party against 
whom a motion for summary judgment is filed has an affirmative obligation to respond 
with admissible evidence to set forth sufficient facts to demonstrate that there is a genuine 
issue for trial. Utah R. Civ. P. 56 (e). See also, e.g.. Freed Fin. Co. v. Stoker Motor Co.. 
537 P.2d 1039 (Utah 1975); Hall v. Fitzgerald 671 P.2d 224 (Utah 1983). As noted 
above, the affidavits filed in opposition to Defendants' motion were properly stricken by 
the trial court. In the absence of any admissible evidence submitted by Thomas, there 
was no disputed issue to preclude summary judgment. 
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IV, The trial court's entry of the 1990 Order was proper. 
In the Brief of Appellant, sub-part HID., Thomas argues that Judge Young's prior 
ruling constituted error but merely incorporates by reference Thomas' objection to that 
ruling filed with the trial court. Thomas' attempt to incorporate argument from a prior 
filing is improper. Furthermore, the objection to which Thomas refers fails to state any 
basis for Thomas' objection. In Thomas' referenced objection, Thomas fails to cite to the 
record in support of the bare assertions made therein. As such, Thomas' objection and 
incorporation by reference are improper. 
V. The trial court properly dismissed all claims against the individual 
defendants, 
Thomas argues that the trial court's 1990 Order dismissing all claims against the 
individual Defendants was improper because "the Complaint and First Amended 
Complaint clearly set forth facts which, if proven, would have provided a basis for 
personal liability and to pierce the corporate veil." Thomas fails to cite any specific 
allegation but again is content to generally assert that the Complaint or First Amended 
Complaint were sufficient. 
Notably, Thomas never received leave to file the First Amended Complaint, but 
rather was given leave to file a separate Amended Complaint, which was never filed. 
Furthermore, since Defendants motion to dismiss was treated as a motion for summary 
judgment, it was Thomas' burden to counter Defendants' motion with some affidavit or 
admissible evidence which would demonstrate a basis upon which to pierce the corporate 
veil in order to assert claims against the individual Defendants. 
14 
The only allegation contained in Thomas' Complaint regarding Thomas' alter ego 
theory, is Thomas' conclusory and unsubstantiated assertion that: 
[t]he individual defendants have operated 3D as a corporation 
as a sham entity to protect themselves from liability for their 
wrongful acts such as those alleged herein. 3D is the alter ego 
of these individual defendants. Consequently, the corporate 
veil should be pierced and the individual defendants held 
liable personally for all wrongful conduct of 3D alleged 
herein. 
(R. 10, at f27) Thomas made no effort to state any specific factual basis for piercing the 
corporate veil. On the other hand, the trial court had before it the Affidavit of Ronald G. 
Davies, which stated that 3D has always acted as a corporation, that it has officers and a 
Board of Directors, maintains separate and distinct financial accounts, employs the 
services of an accountant to maintain corporate distinction in its financial activities, has 
corporate offices furnished with corporate owned equipment, that all work orders, sales 
agreements and invoices pertaining to the sale of the Switch were from 3D. (R. 35-47) 
Notably, the check given to Mr. Thomas was from 3D. 
Having failed to state any specific factual basis in support of Thomas' alter ego 
theory, Thomas is in no position to argue that the trial court's dismissal thereof was 
improper. 
VI. Thomas' did not properly assert a claim for equitable estoppel, 
Thomas argues that the original Complaint properly pled a cause of action for 
equitable estoppel, but if it didn't, Thomas' First Amended Complaint did. Notably, 
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leave to file the First Amended Complaint was never granted, and Thomas' reliance upon 
that pleading is misplaced. 
Thomas' argument with respect to the original Complaint seems disingenuous in 
light of Thomas' statement in Plaintiff Allan Thomas' Memorandum in Opposition to 
Defendants' Motions to Dismiss, wherein Thomas stated: 
Plaintiff intended to plead a cause of action for equitable 
estoppel for his Eighth Cause of Action. In reviewing the 
defendants argument regarding this Cause of Action, plaintiff 
is persuaded that the Cause of Action as currently pleaded 
does not clearly reflect the intended theory. 
(R. 104). At the May 21, 1997 hearing held in this matter, Brian Steffensen, former 
counsel for Thomas, stated: 
"Yes, with respect to, I forget the exact cause of action, but 
they have indicated, and I think rightfully so, that we pled 
vaguely the cause of action for equitable estoppel and we 
have, I have re-pled that cause of action to meet the 
requirements of the cases in that regard. 
(R. 350, 5:13-18) Having previously correctly acknowledged that the Complaint did not 
properly plead a claim for equitable estoppel, Thomas cannot now complain that the trial 
court dismissed that cause of action. 
VII. The trial court properly disqualified Brian Steffensen from representing 
Thomas in this matter. 
In the Brief of Appellant, Thomas acknowledges that attorney Brian Steffensen is a 
witness in this matter but argues that Mr. Steffensen should have been allowed to 
represent Thomas up until the point of trial. In support of Thomas' argument, Thomas 
once again simply attempts to incorporate argument from Thomas' previous filings with 
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the trial court. Thomas' attempt to incorporate argument into his brief is improper and 
should be stricken from the appellate record. 
It is well-settled under Utah law and Rules of Professional Conduct that an 
attorney may not act as an advocate in a matter in which the attorney is likely to be a 
witness. The Utah Rules of Professional Conduct state: 
(a) a lawyer shall not act as an advocate at a trial in which the 
lawyer is likely to be a necessary witness except where: 
(1) The testimony relates to an uncontested issue; 
(2) The testimony relates to the nature and value of 
legal services rendered in the case; or 
(3) Disqualification of the lawyer would work 
substantial hardship on the client. 
Rule 3.7, Utah Rules of Professional Conduct. The rationale behind Rule 3.7 is explained 
in its comment, which states: 
Combining the roles of advocate and witness can prejudice 
the opposing party and can involve conflict of interest 
between the lawyer and the client. 
The opposing party has a proper objection where the 
combination of roles may prejudice that party's rights in the 
litigation. A witness is required to testify on the basis of 
personal knowledge, while an advocate is expected to explain 
and comment on evidence given by others. It may not be 
clear whether a statement by an advocate-witness should be 
taken as proof or as an analysis of the proof. 
In Watkiss & Campbell v. Foa & Son, 808 P.2d 1061 (Utah 1991), the court 
addressed this very issue. In that case, the defendant proffered an affidavit from 
defendant's attorney regarding a legal bill submitted by the plaintiff in order to show that 
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the bill was unreasonable. Id at 1065. On appeal, the plaintiff claimed that an attorney 
cannot testify in an action in which they represent one of the parties, citing Rule 3.7, Utah 
Rules of Professional Conduct. The Court held that even though the affidavit was 
admissible because it presented the attorney's personal testimony and his opinion as an 
expert witness, it was improper for him to submit the affidavit and remain as counsel for 
defendant. Id. The court also noted that it is inadvisable for members of the Bar to testify 
in litigation where they personally represent a party. Id The court stated "[w]e note, 
however, that [the plaintiff] should have objected to [defendant's counsel's] continuing 
representation and that he should have been disqualified." 14. at 1066. 
It should be noted that the rule precluding Mr. Steffensen from simultaneously 
acting as counsel and witness in the same matter is an ethical rule. Although the Rule 
provides a basis for enforcement by an opposing party, Defendants should not have to 
move to disqualify Mr. Steffensen to enforce an ethical rule. 
Mr. Steffensen's role as a fact witness in this matter does not begin at the trial of 
this case, but rather began upon the filing of Thomas' Complaint alleging certain 
communications involving Mr. Steffensen. Mr. Steffensen's adoption of dual roles of 
advocate and witness can only lead to confusion with regard to such things as Thomas' 
discovery responses as well as statements made in support of our opposition to summary 
judgment motions. Notably, in the Brief of Appellant, Thomas specifically identifies 
paragraphs 3 through 22 from Plaintiff Allan Thomas' Memorandum in Opposition to 
Defendant's Motions to Dismiss as paragraphs which precluded summary judgment in 
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Defendants' favor. Brief of Appellant, p. 23. Mr. Steffensen's affidavit is cited in support 
of eight of those twenty paragraphs, for many of which Mr. Steffensen's affidavit is the 
only support cited. Under these circumstances, it is apparent that the trial court properly 
disqualified Mr. Steffensen from acting as counsel in this matter in which he is a material 
witness. 
CONCLUSION 
Thomas offers no explanation why this case was allowed to lie dormant, in the 
words of the Utah Supreme Court, "with a silent reverence accorded that which is 
interred." Under those facts, it cannot be credibly argued that the trial court abused its 
discretion in dismissing Thomas' claim for having failed to pursue that claim with 
reasonable diligence. 
For the reasons stated herein, each of the grounds presented by Thomas in the 
Brief of Appellant are unfounded or otherwise insufficient to overturn the trial court's 
ruling. Defendants therefore respectfully request that the trial court's orders in this case 
be upheld, and that this case which, for all intents and purposes, has already died from 
natural causes, finally be laid to rest. 
DATED this Z - day of September, 1998. 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON 
LjmnfS. Davies 
Kent W. Hansen 
Attorneys for Appellees 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing instrument 
was mailed, first-class, postage prepaid, on this "Z^{ day of September, 1998, to the following: 
David W. StefFensen 
STEFFENSEN, McDONALD, STEFFENSEN 
2159 South 700 East, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
10112-005 
215058 
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